The individual profiled here (M.S.) suffered an episode of severe oxygen deprivation (anoxia) at the age of eight, damaging memory relevant structures in the mid-temporal lobes, including the hippocampus bilaterally. The resulting anterograde amnesia was characterized by profound deficits in autobiographical memory, but also a compromised ability to acquire new facts and information (semantic memory), resulting in the formation of idiosyncratic and naïve beliefs about the natural world that have persisted into his adult years. This article presents an interview with M.S. in which many of these idiosyncratic beliefs are detailed, and argues that they can be broadly viewed as the interaction of; 1) intact frontal lobe functioning that supports the application of rational analysis to his lived experience, and 2) an impoverished factual knowledge base upon which to construct sophisticated and evidence-based models of his lived experience and of natural world processes.
Introduction
The critical role of the hippocampus in the formation of new long-term memories was first documented in seminal papers reporting the now famous case of Henry Gustav Molaison, who until his death in 2008 was known in the psychological literature simply as H.M. (e.g., Corkin, 1984; Corkin, 2002; Scoville & Milner, 1957) . In an attempt to remediate his severe epileptic condition, Molaison underwent radical resection of the mid-temporal lobes (including most of the hippocampus bilaterally), resulting in an intractable amnestic condition, affecting his ability to form new memories for facts and information (semantic memory) and personally experienced events (autobiographical memory) post-operatively, and one year pre-operatively (Corkin, 1984; Corkin, 2002) . In the years since these reports, cognitive neuroscience has definitively established that injury to structures in the mid-temporal lobes, notably the hippocampus and surrounding cortex, produces a relatively isolated impairment of long term memory, a condition known as anterograde amnesia (see Gabrieli, 1998; Squire, 1992; Squire & Zola, 1998; and Squire & Zola-Morgan, 1988 ; for reviews).
An amnestic condition similar to the one produced by mid-temporal lobe damage can also be produced by damage to the thalamus, specifically midline thalamic nuclei (Squire, 1982; Squire, 1992; Victor, Adams, & Collins, 1989) . status epilepticus accompanied by respiratory arrest, rendering him comatose for approximately 12 hours. His immediate post recovery condition involved a generalized confusion, disorientation, and an inability to recognize family members. While this condition proved to be transitory, severe anterograde amnesia remains as a permanent consequence of this event.
M.S.'s scores on the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale -Revised (WAIS -R, see Wechsler, 1981) as reported in Winter, Broman, Rose, and Reber (2001) are as follows: Verbal scale -78, Performance scale -94, full scale -82 (see Table 1 ). While the Full scale value of 82 places him in the low normal range, virtually all evaluations that tap long term memory demonstrate profound deficiencies. His long-term retrieval score in the Woodcock Johnson -Revised Battery (Woodcock & Johnson, 1977) ranks in the 3rd percentile (see Table 2 ), and delayed recall score for both Visual-Auditory, and Memory for Names subtests rank in the 1st percentile. Broman, Rose, Hotson, and Casey (1997) reported severely deficient performance in the Wechsler Memory Scale -Revised (Wechsler, 1987) in both the verbal memory (score = 51; -3 SD) and visual memory (score = 57; -2 SD). Moreover, the authors note that for many basic language skills, such as reading and word fluency, M.S. performs as if these capabilities were developmentally arrested at the time of his trauma. Other functions were marginally less compromised; basic mathematical skills appear to have achieved a fifth grade equivalence. Interestingly, conceptual language abilities, as assessed by tests of sentence comprehension, grammatical capability, and complex ideational material, have progressed to adult levels (Broman, Rose, Hotson, & Casey, 1997; Winter, 2001 Winter, , 2002 .
His immediate attention, planning and organizational capacity is strong. Verbal and nonverbal logic and problem solving skills have also progressed to adult levels. This last point is exemplified by his strong performance (50-75%tile) on the Raven Matrices, an evaluation which loads heavily on nonverbal perceptual and logical skills (Penrose & Raven, 1936; Raven, 1938) . The capabilities impaired in M.S. are those that are dependent upon long term memory for their normal development (Broman, Rose, Hotson, & Casey, 1997; Winter, 1995; Winter, Broman, Rose, & Reber, 2001) . The most severely compromised long term memory function in M.S. is his ability to form new explicit memories, especially for personally experienced events. In fact, it appears that M.S has virtually no residual ability to form memories of an autobiographical nature. On the other hand, he retains some ability to learn new general facts and information (semantic memory), although this capability is highly degraded, as evidenced by his deficient scores on tests of vocabulary, memory for names, and fact learning evaluations (Broman, Rose, Hotson, & Casey, 1997; Winter, 1995; Winter, Broman, Rose, & Reber, 2001 ). The new information that he has been able to acquire has been relatively sparse, isolated, and occasional. He learned for example, that Jay Leno replaced Johnny Carson on the Tonight Show, and that Tetris was the name of a computer game he enjoyed, despite the fact that these two developments came after the onset of his amnesia. Also, as it has been demonstrated with many amnesics, M.S. has been shown to have preserved implicit (non-declarative) memory (Broman, Rose, Hotson, & Casey, 1997; Winter, 1995; Winter, Broman, Rose, & Reber, 2001) . This is the type of memory that supports motor and cognitive skill learning, as well as priming and conditioning effects. His amnestic condition, as it is typically the case with irreversible hippocampal injury, has not improved, and has remained relatively stable since the precipitating incident.
M.S. shows none of the behaviors that are thought to typify frontal lobe pathology, such as confabulation, perseveration, disinhibition, or amotivation. Bilateral atrophy of the hippocampal formation was confirmed by MRI, using a technique introduced by Press, Amaral, and Squire (1989) . Additional technical information regarding the MRI imaging can be found in the complete clinical report by Broman, Rose, Hotson, and Casey (1997) . M.S. remains in the care of specialists and is under medication for both asthma and seizure disorder. 
Method
Several studies by Piaget (1951 Piaget ( , 1967 Piaget ( , 1969 Piaget ( , 1970 explored the development of naturalistic reasoning in children;
as in those studies, the method employed here is that of structured interview, in part, mirroring the specific queries that appear in those publications. This interview, as with previous published work with this individual by this author, was conducted with the written permission and consent of M.S. and his parents, and with the formal approval of the Institutional Review Board of the institution in which the research was conducted. At the time of this writing, M.S. is 54 years old. Piaget (1951) noted that younger children would often give agentic, volitional, or anthropomorphic reasons to explain natural phenomena, while older children -usually by the age of eight -would provide explanations that refer to natural processes. For example, while a 4 year old child may say that the sun rises because it wants to wake up, or to fly across the sky, etc., an older child will provide a reason that invokes the turning or movement of the earth. The above section of interview is typical of M.S. in that he does not adopt agentic, volitional or anthropomorphic explanations. His explanations are occasionally naïve, but firmly naturalistic. He laughs off the suggestion that the sun is alive, or that it can feel pain; moreover, he explains that "It doesn't really move across the sky. The planets move around the sun. The sun doesn't really rise and set -it looks like it but it doesn't". He states that the sun is made of fire, but admits that he does not know "what is burning"; he does not offer the simplistic explanation that the sun's fire is fueled by wood.
He proposes a charming rationale for why "nature" (by which he clearly means vegetation) is green, based on his knowledge of the mixture of the colors blue and yellow. But he offers this tentatively, quickly adding "I don't know if that's true".
M.S.'s explanation of the changing of the seasons continues to be dominated by his belief that because the sun is a star, it must have the shape of a cartoon-like, five-pointed figure. He holds this belief despite the fact that when observed at sunrise, sunset, or dimly through cloud cover, the shape of the sun is obviously circular, a perception that M.S. is probably familiar with. It may be that he maintains this naïve belief because it allows him to create what he regards as a satisfying explanation for the changing of the seasons. It is also possible that M.S.
is deliberately rejecting the visual evidence that the sun is round in favor of an abstract, geometrical representation which he believes to be more scientifically accurate. In any case, he is clearly attempting to create a model based on natural conditions and processes, albeit one based upon his faulty understanding.
Psychological Thought 2016, Vol. 9(2), 259-271 doi:10.5964/psyct.v9i2.180 M.S. is self-aware of his memory deficit, as well as his epileptic and asthmatic conditions, and understands that he is unable to live as an independent adult. His remark that he "follows his parents" is likely a darkly comic reference to this fact. Here M.S. is perfectly comfortable responding to questions about germs, acknowledging that they are invisible to the naked eye but can be viewed through a microscope. This is in marked contrast to his alarmed reaction after viewing single celled organisms through a microscope in the science museum several years earlier. It is possible that since then he has been able to create a viable mental representation for such organisms. Another possibility is that the word germs primes a specific set of familiar concepts -that these are the invisible bugs that sometime will make you sick, or can kill you, etc., -but that no such familiar representation is primed during the actual experience of watching tiny organisms swimming about in a drop of water. It may be that his confusion concerning the creatures viewed through the microscope would have been ameliorated had I used the word germs to explain what he saw. His crack about germs coming from Germany is typical of his fondness for puns and wordplay. M.S. has apparently heard of such terms as missing link, and evolution, but states flatly that he does not understand what they mean. He quickly, and perhaps defensively, defaults to the Biblical explanation to account for human presence on the earth. This is the only area of questioning in which he does not attempt to provide a naturalistic explanation. When asked whether humans may have changed over time, he responds with the question: "Yeah, but how could you prove that?" signaling some comprehension of the evolutionary position, but also a ready skepticism. His endorsement of the Biblical account is not unequivocal; in response to the suggestion that we are all descendants of Adam and Eve, he does not say, "That's what I believe", but the more tentative "Yes, that's what they say". His response concerning differences in hair and eye color demonstrates that he lacks an understanding of the mechanisms of inheritance. Asked about why hair turns gray or why some men are bald, he does not mention aging or genetics, but refers with uncertainty to "changes in life", or "changes in the body". He is so unfamiliar with the term fossils that he confuses it with the word faucet (unless he was attempting another pun), yet he is aware of the opinion that dinosaurs may have lived upon the earth long ago, offering, "They say they were here one time". M.S. knows that the moon moves around the earth as the earth moves around the sun, and assumes this to be a relatively rare insight, stating, "people don't know that!" He also accurately explains that a solar eclipse results from the imposition of the moon between the earth and the sun. Curiously, he asserts that the moon is sometimes more distant than the sun; this may be his way of accounting for the "moon illusion"; the moon appears very large at horizon (and may be interpreted as close), but becomes smaller as it approaches zenith (and therefore apparently distant).
He is confident that neither the moon nor stones are alive or that a stone could feel pain, but he does assert that a stone could "change in the earth", hinting at a basic awareness of geomorphology. This is echoed in his questions about rocks turning into gold or diamonds (which he asked with definite interest). Also, he knows that iron occurs in a mixture with other rocks in the earth. He provides succinct distinctions between living and non-living things: "It doesn't move by itself", and "Something that isn't alive doesn't grow. Nothing's changing." He has no problem with the possibility that animals have feelings and can think, although he is not sure whether a dog's sense-based memory qualifies as true cognition. M.S. explains his knowledge of the relationship between snow and water by referring to an empirical test: snow held in the hand will melt into water. He grasps the essentials of the rain/water cycle, citing the origin of clouds and rain to be evaporated from the oceans. He knows that lightning is electricity, and conjectures that it occurs when dark clouds touch one another. He correctly refers to a common causation for lightning and thunder, and the temporal relationship between them. He knows that the sky is nothing more than air, but cannot account for its color, an accurate explanation of which would require a sophisticated comprehension of differential absorption of wavelengths of light. He understands that the ocean is blue because it reflects the color of the sky. In contrast to his previous earnest reference to Adam and Eve, M.S. jokes about the devil being at the center of the earth. Moreover, he makes a probabilistic (and naturalistic) inference about what might be found at the center of the earth: He reasons that because most of the earth is covered by ocean, and that sand is at the bottom of the ocean, it is likely that sand is found at the center of the earth.
Based on his knowledge of the distances and time differences between points, M.S. has (upon his own initiative) developed a method to estimate the circumference of the earth at 24,000 miles. The estimate given by the United States National Aeronautic and Space Administration (NASA) is 24,873.6 miles at the equator (National Aeronautic and Space Administration, n.d.). He knows that gravity impels objects to fall to earth, and that the gravity on the moon is less than on earth, but does not know why.
Discussion
M.S. became amnesic due to brain injury that occurred at the age of eight. The quality of his responses in the interview described above is consistent with Piaget's developmental principle (Piaget, 1951 ) that by eight years of age, children will offer naturalistic (as opposed to anthropomorphic) explanations for physical processes of the world. This developmental milestone, once achieved, appears to be resistant to subsequent compromise of long term memory.
The extent and severity of M.S.'s amnesia may seem anomalous when compared to some other reports of childhood amnesics, including those with specific hippocampal injury (see, Baddeley, Vargha-Khadem, & Mishkin, 2001; Benedict, Shapiro, Duffner, & Jaeger, 1998; Ostergaard, 1987; Vargha-Khadem, 2001; Vargha-Khadem et al., 1997; Vicari et al., 2007; Wood, Brown, & Felton, 1989) . In those cases, semantic memory is reported to survive at normal or near normal levels despite impairments in episodic memory. This relative sparing of semantic memory has lead to the theoretical interpretation that episodic and autobiographical memory is directly dependent upon the hippocampus, but that semantic memory is separately dependent upon surrounding structures, such as perirhinal and entorhinal cortices (e.g., Vargha-Khadem et al., 1997) . The task of disambiguating the roles of these mid-temporal lobe structures is, however, complicated by the indeterminacy of the extent of brain injury revealed in an imaging study. For example, ancillary lesions of functional importance may be too small to visualize with current brain imaging techniques; these lesions may remain undiscovered until postmortem neuropathological examination (Rempel-Clower, Zola, Squire, & Amaral, 1996; Squire & Zola, 1998) . The MRI study reported by Broman, Rose, Hotson, and Casey (1997) , revealed that M.S.'s brain injury appeared to be limited to bilateral hippocampal atrophy. The possibility remains that the unusual severity of his memorial deficit owes to as yet undetected brain pathology to memory relevant structures.
Unlike amnesia due to damage to midline thalamic nuclei (as in Korsakoff's syndrome, referenced above), medial temporal lobe amnesia tends not to be complicated by behaviors usually associated with frontal lobe pathology (Moscovitch, 1982; Squire, 1982; Squire, 1992) . The behavior of M.S. honors this distinction in that he does not confabulate, perseverate, or show other signs of frontal lobe dysfunction, such as disinhibition, disorientation, or inappropriate affect. In contrast, his manner is composed and organized; his communications are lucid, direct, relevant and non-tangential. He is in fact, almost painfully veridical in his responses; as shown above, he appropriately and readily admits when he does not know (or is unsure of) an answer. His ability to concentrate and focus is strong, and he shows normal release from proactive interference (Winter, Broman, Rose, & Reber, 2001) . It is highly unlikely, for example, that M.S.'s belief that the sun is a five pointed star is evidence of psychotic delusion or confabulation, but rather a naïve conceptualization owing to his impoverished factual knowledge base. In spite of this, he retains robust analytic and logical powers, as it has been shown in numerous formal and informal evaluations (see Broman, Rose, Hotson, & Casey, 1997; Winter, Broman, Rose, & Reber, 2001) . His ability to devise a novel method of estimating the circumference of the earth is an example of his willingness and ability to employ logical analysis, as it was his ability to discover an algorithm for the Tower of Hanoi puzzle (Winter, Broman, Rose, & Reber, 2001) . What has been most fundamentally compromised is his ability to compose stable, explicit long term memories for newly introduced complex information, thus resulting in the often naïve interpretations of natural phenomena as described above.
The original contribution and significance of the research reported here is to document that intact long-term semantic memory is necessary to create and sustain veridical cognitive representations of natural world processes.
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